The Identification, Investigation And Analysis ...
The IIT experts analyse physical evidence collected by the FFM or by third parties. Third party samples are submitted with detailed documentation on how the sample was collected and the chain of custody. The IIT checks and verifies the authenticity of the submitted documentation. Samples are sent for analysis to OPCW Designated Laboratories around the globe which operate completely independently from each other to ensure impartial and scientifically sound results on the basis of established practices and procedures.
The Identification, Investigation and Analysis ...
The IIT is further required to preserve and provide information to the investigation mechanism established by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 71/248 (2016) [International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (IIIM)], as well as to any relevant investigatory entities established under the auspices of the United Nations.
The second report of the IIT sets out the findings of the investigations conducted in the period between April 2020 and March 2021, focusing on the incident in Saraqib, the Syrian Arab Republic, on 4 February 2018.
The third report of the IIT sets out the findings of the investigations conducted in the period between January 2021 and December 2022, focusing on the incident in Douma, the Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018.
Objectives: To carry out a review of published and unpublished work on the analysis on methods of accident investigation in high-risk industries, and of critical incidents in healthcare. To develop and pilot guidelines for the analysis of critical incidents in healthcare for the hospital sector, mental health and primary care.
Data sources: Literature already available in the Clinical Risk Unit, University College London. Work by known experts in the field of accident investigation and analysis. Electronic databases including PsycINFO and MEDLINE. Websites for accident investigation reports.
Review methods: Twelve techniques from other high-risk industries were reviewed in detail using criteria developed for the purpose. This review provided a conceptual framework for the healthcare review and appraisal process, as well as providing a critical assessment of the industry techniques. Rigorous searching and screening identified 138 papers for formal appraisal and a further 114 were designated as providing potentially useful background information. A formal appraisal instrument was designed, piloted and modified until acceptable reliability was achieved. From the 138 papers, six techniques were identified as representing clearly definable approaches to incident investigation and analysis. All relevant papers were reviewed for each of the six techniques: Australian Incident Monitoring System, the Critical Incident Technique, Significant Event Auditing, Root Cause Analysis, Organisational Accident Causation Model and Comparison with Standards approach.
Results: All healthcare techniques had the potential of being applied in any specialty or discipline related to healthcare. While a few studies looked solely at death as an outcome, most used a variety of outcomes including near misses. Most techniques used interviewing and primary document review to investigate incidents. All techniques included papers that identified clinical issues and some attempt to assess underlying errors, causes and contributory factors. However the extent and sophistication of the various attempts varied widely. Only a third of papers referred to an established model of accident causation. In most studies examined there was little or no information on the training of investigators, how the data was extracted or any information on quality assurance for data collection and analysis. There was some variation in the level of expertise and training required but to undertake the investigation to an acceptable depth all required some expertise. In most papers there was little or no discussion of implementation of any changes as a result of the investigations. A quarter of publications gave some description of the implementation of changes, though few addressed evaluation of changes.
Conclusions: The reviews demonstrate that, while much valuable work has been accomplished, there is considerable potential for further development of techniques, the utilisation of a wider range of techniques and a need for validation and evaluation of existing methods which would make incident investigation more versatile and use limited resources more effectively. Further exploration of techniques used in high-risk industries, with interviews and observation of actual investigations should prove valuable. Existing healthcare techniques would benefit from formal evaluation of their outcomes and effectiveness. Studies should examine depth of investigation and analysis, adequacy and feasibility of recommendations and cost effectiveness. Examining implementation of recommendations is a key issue.
Web-based surveys were sent to Canadian certified ergonomists, Joint Health and Safety Committees (JHSCs) and health and safety certification trainers to understand better which ergonomics analysis tools were used in industry and help JHSCs obtain the necessary training required to reduce work-related musculoskeletal disorders (WMSDs). The results showed that most of the certified ergonomists used the Snook/Mital tables, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) equation and rapid upper limb assessment (RULA) /rapid entire body assessment (REBA). The most frequently used methods by JHSCs to identify ergonomics risk were injury reports and worker complaints. The surveys for the health and safety certification trainers revealed that most curricula did not include ergonomics analysis tools. There appears to be a gap between what is recommended by certified ergonomists for JHSC, what is taught in training and what is used by JHSCs for ergonomics risk analysis. A better understanding, modifications in training curricula and education of JHSCs are needed to help reduce WMSDs.
The investigation of incidents has assumed a predominate role in creating safety within an organization. Incident investigation can yield great benefits in the identification of hazards. This course now integrates a full day lab session, highlighting the practical aspects of incident investigation. The course presents the principles of Human Factors, Management, Investigation and Analysis. It is realized that very few people will investigate a major accident but all supervisors will investigate incidents and make recommendations. It will provide you with the why incidents occur. It will explain how incidents are discovered, investigated, and reported in writing. Finally, the student will learn the techniques of data collection and analysis.
Who Should Attend: Supervisors who will investigate incidents, part time safety advisors, Quality Assurance, and ATC supervisors. This a good course for personnel responsible for the data analysis program.
During the automated investigation of alerts, Microsoft Defender for Office 365 analyzes the original email for threats and identifies other emails that are related to the original email and potentially part of an attack. This analysis is important because email attacks rarely consist of a single email.
The automated investigation's email analysis identifies email clusters using attributes from the original email to query for emails sent and received by your organization. This is similar to a security operations analyst would hunt for the related emails in Explorer or Advanced Hunting. Several queries are used to identify matching emails because attackers typically morph the email parameters to avoid security detection. The clustering analysis performs these checks to determine how to handle emails involved in the investigation:
Email clustering analysis via similarity and malicious entity queries ensures that email problems are fully identified and cleaned up, even if only one email from an attack gets identified. You can use links from the email cluster details side panel views to open the queries in Explorer or Advanced Hunting to perform deeper analysis and change the queries if needed. This capability enables manual refinement and remediation if you find the email cluster's queries too narrow or too broad (including unrelated emails).
During the email clustering analysis, all clustering queries will ignore security mailboxes set up as Security Operations mailboxes in the Advanced Delivery policy. Similarly, the email clustering queries will ignore phish simulation (education) messages that are configured in the Advanced Delivery policy. Neither the SecOps nor the PhishEdu exclusion values are shown in the query to keep the clustering attributes simple and easy to read. This exclusion ensures that threat intelligence and operational mailboxes (SecOps mailboxes) and the phish simulations (PhishEdu) are ignored during threat analysis and do not get removed during any remediation.
The investigation email analysis calculates email threats and locations at the time of the investigation to create the investigation evidence and actions. This data can get stale and outdated when actions outside of the investigation affect the emails involved in the investigation. For example, security operations manual hunting and remediation may clean up emails included in an investigation. Likewise, deletion actions approved in parallel investigations or Zero-hour auto purge (ZAP) automatic quarantine actions may have removed emails. In addition, delayed detections of threats after email delivery may change the number of threats included in the investigation's email queries/clusters.
For email or email clusters in the Entities tab of an investigation, Prevented means that there was no malicious emails in the mailbox for this item (mail or cluster). Here is an example. 041b061a72